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Historicising intervention: strategy and
synchronicity in British intervention 1815–50
JOHN MACMILLAN*
Abstract. This article identifies three key themes in British intervention for purposes of liberal
reordering in the period 1815–50, namely the ‘opening-up’ of new market spaces (discussed in
relation to Uruguay/the Argentine Confederation in the 1840s), a cosmopolitan humanitarianism
evident in the campaign for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade that ran throughout this
period, and the political-ideological contest between constitutionalist and absolutist forces and
represented here by intervention in the Iberian Peninsula in the late 1820s to1830s. In develop-
ing a strategic perspective upon military/naval intervention the analysis shows its utility to
have been subordinate to more fundamental sociopolitical, cultural, and institutional deter-
minants. With regard to understanding the outcomes of specific intervention the analysis
shows the importance of systematically evaluating developments in the domestic political envi-
ronments of both intervening and target state as well as the military campaign itself and the
need for sufficient general alignment or synchronisation in the timeline of developments in
each of these three domains. This model helps to explain that whilst liberal interventions are
not necessarily bound to fail, they frequently prove more difficult, complex, and protracted
than the interveners expect.
John MacMillan is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Brunel University.
Introduction
Liberal intervention since the end of the Cold War has frequently proved more difficult,
complex and protracted than policymakers initially envisaged. The defining military
interventions of the age in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan leave little doubt
that intervention frequently disappoints any expectations of a short and decisive
exercise of force. Yet the reasons for this are under-theorised and the literature is
divided upon the question of whether the complications and difficulties that engulf
specific interventions should be regarded as a consequence of particular planning or
operational problems or whether it is inherent in the practice of intervention itself.1
A historical perspective is useful here for generating comparative analyses across dif-
ferent periods and for developing a longer-term view on the impact and determinants
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1 See, for example, Shahar Hameiri, Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the
Global Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010), pp. 18–38; Taylor Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Inter-
vention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford: SIPRI, 2007); Adnan Pachachi, ‘The Road to
Failure in Iraq’, New York Times (4 April 2013), available at: {http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
04/04/the-road-to-failure-in-iraq/?_r=0} accessed 31 July 2013.
of intervention outcomes, which by definition is unavailable for analyses of recent
and present-day interventions. As a step in this direction, this article develops a
general model or framework of analysis that focuses upon the strategic and opera-
tional dimensions of intervention and applies it empirically to British intervention
in the period from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the middle of the nineteenth
century, whilst drawing some parallels with intervention in the present.
If ‘strategy’ is ‘the process of selecting goals and choosing appropriate means to
achieve them within the resource constraints faced’,2 a historical analysis allows one
to evaluate the place of military intervention in determining those big questions and
issues that comprise the major themes of Great Power ordering and reordering in any
specific age. Crucially, the impact of military intervention can be analysed in relation
to a wider set of factors and processes, which would also have been influential in
determining the issues at stake, namely the sociopolitical, cultural, and institutional.
In the period 1815–50, the main themes or ‘problems’ of ‘ordering’ that Britain as
the liberal hegemonic Power tended to intervene over were the ‘opening-up’ of the
world economy (stimulated by industrialisation); the defence of Christian communities
(particularly in the Ottoman Empire) and the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade
as religious objections were reinforced by the notion of the ‘rights of man’; and the
politically delicate question of ‘revolution’ in Europe as the reverberations of 1789
and the appeal of liberalism and national self-determination continued to shake the
absolutist Powers. This is not to say that there were not also other factors, most
notably considerations of the balance of power in the ‘Eastern Question’ that were
also important, but rather that there were certain specific themes and issues that
reflected the particular character of the age. In this vein, since the end of the Cold
War liberal military interventions have tended to coalesce around themes of Islamic-
Western relations; the security implications of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ postcolonial states;
humanitarian crises and human rights; and since 2011 the question of whether to
intervene in the civil and transnational conflicts associated with the ‘Arab Spring’.
Hence whilst each age may manifest certain lines of continuity with its predecessors
it also has its own distinctive character defined in relation to the historical develop-
ment and evolution of the modern world and the specific contradictions and crises
that this generates.
What emerges very clearly is that the relationship between military intervention
and the achievement of political aims for Britain in the early nineteenth century was
complex and if one focuses only on the military dimension at times paradoxical.
With regard to ‘opening up’, for example, the imagined markets of both China and
Latin America were regarded by commercial groups as of enormous prospective
significance, if only one could create a suitable and stable trading order and develop
access to the interior. In both regions intervention was used to achieve commercial
aims. However, whereas British intervention in China was militarily successful, the
attainment of political aims proved strictly limited, whilst at the River Plate inter-
vention was militarily a failure but shortly after its ignominious end the political
(commercial) aims were freely given. Patently, in both cases there were other factors
at work, which determined the political issues at stake. By the same token, the
limited political utility of military intervention in the recurring cycles of civil war
and revolution associated with the struggle between absolutist and constitutional
2 Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, p. 23.
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social forces is also evident. Whilst intervention may have influenced the fate of
particular revolutions it was unable to address the underlying causes. Yet, after
1848 the ‘problem’ of revolution faded from significance, having being settled at a
deeper political level, at least until it re-emerged in the face of a different set of social
pressures during the First World War.3 With regard to the Atlantic slave trade to
Brazil, why was it in 1849–50 that the thirty year abolition campaign met with success
but not a decade earlier when Palmerston had also intensified intervention? What
emerges is that in order to understand the impact of specific military interventions
and the development and fate of the underlying issues at stake it is important to
recognise the interplay between military action and the wider sociopolitical and cul-
tural milieu both within the intervening and the intervened state.
Whilst there is a large general theoretical literature on the factors that shape the
propensity to use force, and a significant literature on individual interventions that in
various degrees integrates theory and practice, general theoretical frameworks for un-
derstanding intervention remain underdeveloped.4 With few exceptions the analysis
tends to be piecemeal and lacking a general model or framework through which to
comprehend the determinants of intervention outcomes and within which to situate
many of the ‘syndromes’ associated with military intervention such as, for example,
the risks of ‘quaqmire’ or ‘mission-creep’, or the challenges of consistency and legiti-
macy. To this end the article offers a basic model which highlights the power of
factors across three different domains of social interaction to determine the outcomes
of intervention and the requirement for a timeline in which developments in each do-
main are sufficiently aligned or synchronised with those in the others. The three do-
mains comprise the military sphere, the domestic political sphere within the interven-
ing state, and the domestic political sphere within the target state (see fig. 1). The
model helps to explain that whilst liberal military interventions are not necessarily
bound to ‘fail’, however this may be defined, they are inherently difficult with a high
risk of complications.
Whilst one might assume that intervening Powers have superior military capacity,
this may not necessarily translate into a military victory locally nor deliver the inter-
veners political aims. Also, factors within the target state are always important,
whether this be the strength of political will to resist or perhaps the lack of political
or institutional capacity to deliver what the intervener requires. But so too are political
considerations within the intervening state. The capacity for domestic political factors
to hamstring military operations is probably most pronounced within a democracy
given such constitutional-institutional factors as the formal independence of the
3 John M. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime
Change, 1510–2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
4 See, for example, Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, ‘Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War
American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42:4 (1998),
pp. 395–417; Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of
Military Force, 1981–2005’, International Security, 30:1 (2005), pp. 140–77; William G. Howell and
Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007); Timothy Hildebrandt, Courtney Hillebrecht, and Peter M. Holm,
‘The Domestic Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology’,
Foreign Policy Analysis, 9 (2013), pp. 243–66; and for case-based work see, for example, Ioan Lewis
and James Mayall, ‘Somalia’, in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds), United Nations Interven-
tionism 1991–2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 108–38; Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey
A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, ‘Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?’,
International Security, 37:1 (2012), pp. 7–40.
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legislature and judiciary from the executive, the normative-legal environment, and
the presence of opposition political parties that may have different notions regarding
foreign policy and be in a position to execute them following electoral success (as
illustrated below).
The key contribution of the strategic perspective and operational model offered
here is to force an interactive understanding of the dynamics and determinants of
intervention operations and outcomes. This captures the point that intervention out-
comes are a product of the interplay between factors in both the intervening and the
target state and the importance of the fit between them at a specific point in time.
The issue with alignment or synchronisation arises because the three domains operate
along separate and quasi-autonomous timelines. To put it differently, they do not
orbit the same sun. If one takes, for example, NATO action in Afghanistan there
is a clear disjuncture between the domestic political timeline that is constructed in
accordance with the electoral cycle at home and military estimates of the timeline
for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and in turn with the still longer timeline held by
Military Aspects of
the intervention
Political
Conditions in
the intervening
state
Political
Conditions (will
and capacity) in
the target state
Figure 1. The interactive dynamics of intervention
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the Taliban for its will and capacity to sustain the conflict.5 In the Afghanistan case
there is no obvious prospect of synchronisation between the three domains as did
happen, for example, in the case of slave trade abolition discussed below. But in
any case, whilst synchronisation does not mean that intervention will necessarily
succeed in its immediate objectives the lack of synchronisation in any sphere may
well be sufficient to impede or undermine the intervention.
Besides these specific interactive dynamics that are illustrated empirically below,
there are also a number of general contextual factors that operate, often in combina-
tion, to make liberal military intervention inherently difficult. The first is the highly
ambitious political nature of many liberal interventions. These often seek to induce
or advance liberal reordering projects whether this be the incorporation of states
into a world market, the regulation of domestic political-ideological forces in the
target, statebuilding, democracy promotion, or the way regimes treat their citizens.
The second factor is closely related, namely the highly intrusive character of many
interventions evident in the sensitive political and social areas that are targeted. Typ-
ically, this might be in relation to questions of constitutional form and regime type,
socioeconomic system, the treatment of citizens or minorities, the status of foreigners
or foreign property, or marked by interference in long-standing local tensions and
rivalries between different groups with direct implications for the distribution of
power and status between them. All of these, in one way or another, are pretty
much guaranteed to get under the skin. Hence what for the intervening Power may
be an issue of instrumental or non-vital importance, can for groups within the target
state be a high-stakes, even existential matter, which may in turn lead to high levels
of resistance or evasion.
Third, John Vincent was very clear that a characteristic of intervention is that it is
a discrete event: ‘though intervention is a perennial feature of international politics . . . ,
each intervention is a discrete act; an intervention made permanent becomes some-
thing else’.6 Now, whilst in the present age involvement increasingly extends beyond
the combat phase of any intervention the presence and withdrawal of military forces
continues to represent a politically and symbolically important, indeed watershed,
phase of the engagement. Further, interventions are still frequently justified as being
of limited, discrete duration, not least in order to gain the necessary political and
military support at home. This, however, alerts target regimes to the political diffi-
culties intervention may present for the intervening Power which in turn may stiffen
resistance and affect the strategy of the target actor’s forces. Hence long before
Saddam Hussein asserted in 1990 that democracies didn’t have the stomach for a
long fight the seasoned Argentine diplomat General Guido, when asked in December
1845 for his opinion on how to defeat the British, replied that the Argentines did not
need to win, just to keep fighting.7
Fourth, given that military interventions are often intended to be discrete and
limited affairs, the intervener requires some mechanism or set of social relations
through which to ensure longer-term compliance. This might simply be the threat of
5 Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles
in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs, 87:2 (2011), pp. 27–96.
6 John Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),
p. 8.
7 Quoted in David McLean,War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata,
1836–1853 (London: Tauris, 1995), p. 103.
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renewed intervention or a more permanent coercive form of imperial relationship,
such as colonisation. But repeat interventions, let alone annexations, are costly
affairs and hence interveners have typically sought an alternative political strategy
through which to secure their objectives. The politics of intervention, then, are often
geared towards seeking a state of cooperation, albeit coerced cooperation, between
the intervener and target. Again, the point is not lost on the target actors, for the
nineteenth-century Chinese Qing rulers reckoned on the British having sufficient
power to force their way into the power structure of the ruling elite but not enough
to play a part in government without their help.8 Thus, despite the presence of signifi-
cant differences in the coercive power of the intervener and the target, the intervener –
particularly if the intervention is for liberal or democratic ends – is likely to require a
measure of ‘partnership’ with the target if it is to achieve its political aims, and this
can prove difficult and unpredictable.
British intervention 1815–50
In turning now to consider the model in relation to British intervention between
1815–50, the selected cases discussed below fall within the major (re)ordering themes
of the age and are taken from a wide range of geographical areas.9 With regard to
the coercive incorporation of a peripheral zone into the world market (or ‘opening-
up’) the cases of China and the Argentine confederation represent the two regions
to which contemporaries attached greatest value whilst being sufficiently different
to draw out the factors that determine intervention outcomes. With regard to the
humanitarian strand the campaign for the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade
has been described as the ‘most expensive international moral effort in modern world
history’10 and has been cited recently as a model of robust and successful interven-
tion. Accordingly, it merits a closer look in order to draw out the conditions of this
apparent success. The cases selected to highlight the challenges of intervention in the
major ideological struggle of the age are those of the Portuguese Civil War (1832–4)
and the Spanish Civil War (1834–9). Whilst it is not possible here to fully and sys-
tematically test the explanatory power of the synchronicity model the cases are able
to highlight the mechanisms through which it operates. It also shows that many of
the problems associated with intervention in the present age were also abundantly
evident in the early nineteenth century too. The first part of the discussion across
each theme offers some contextual background and focuses on the strategic dimen-
sion whilst the second part focuses on the operational.
8 John K. Fairbank, ‘The Creation of the Treaty System’, in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank
(eds), The Cambridge History of Modern China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 144.
9 For recent discussions of intervention in this period see Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, Humanitarian
Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Davide Rodogno, Against
Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2012).
10 Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, ‘Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s
Sixty Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade’, International Organization, 53 (1999), p. 633.
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‘Opening up’ I
It is the business of Government to open and secure roads for the merchant. (Lord Palmerston,
1841)11
The termination by parliament of the East India Company’s monopoly on trade with
China in 1833 also marked the end of a specific social structure of trade that, whilst
bureaucratic and restrictive, had accommodated and internalised a number of sensi-
tive political issues, which subsequently proved difficult to renegotiate. Nevertheless,
the Company’s monopoly had become increasingly outdated due both to British
industrialisation and the rise of the opium trade. Industrialisation led to a shift in
the economic significance of China for Britain from being a supplier of luxuries
such as silk and tea to a potentially enormous market for British commerce and
manufactures, the difficult issue of access permitting. The rise of the opium trade
had dramatically altered the balance of trade in Britain’s favour but was at the
same time becoming an increasing concern for the Qing rulers and cause of friction
in Anglo-Chinese relations. Yet British ideas about commerce (and associated notions
of European civilisation and progress) held little appeal to the ‘Celestial Empire’.
Rather, the Qing rulers perceived themselves to be at the centre of civilisation and
held little interest in dealings with the foreign barbarians, whom they sought to
contain at the frontier and who were expected to recognise the emperor’s authority.12
Thus, when Britain sent as the first post-Company Superintendent a government
representative, William Napier, rather than a senior merchant as the Chinese had
indicated, the local Viceroy refused to receive him: after all, the Chinese were not
part of ‘international society’ and did not recognise the principle of the sovereign
equality of states or European norms of diplomatic practice.
It was, however, the issue of ‘market access’ that excited the merchant lobby and
already in 1830 the Canton merchants had expressed to parliament their frustration
at the failure of diplomacy to expand the China trade and argued for the use of force,
which was a view subsequently shared by Napier. The issue continued to simmer
until in 1839 Commissioner Lin pursued a much more robust approach to the sup-
pression of the opium trade and confined the British trading community at Canton
until they handed over their stock, which they did after the British Superintendent
promised compensation. It was this ‘insult to the flag’ that gave the British Foreign
Secretary Lord Palmerston, the necessary pretext for the first ‘Opium War’ in which
British naval power proved overwhelming. Yet the translation of the power of the
gunboat into a new order of commercial relations was a different matter. To this
end the efforts were grounded in the ‘Treaty System’ established under the Treaty of
Nanking, 1842, which was intended to form a new institutional base for the develop-
ment of commerce.13 Its provisions included the abolition of the Cohong monopoly,
the opening of five ports for trade, equal intercourse between officials of correspond-
ing rank, a uniform moderate tariff on imports and exports, the cession of the island
11 Quoted in Harry Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain’s 1840–42 War with China, and its
Aftermath (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2004), p. 39.
12 See Yen-P’ing Hao and Erh-Min Wang, ‘Changing Views of Western Relations, 1840–95’, in Denis
Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds), The Cambridge History of Modern China, vol. 11 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 142–201.
13 Par Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth Century
China and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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of Hong Kong to Britain, and the payment of a war indemnity (which included the
cost of the confiscated opium).
However, for the Chinese the Nanking Treaty was less an epiphany on the road
to Manchester than a tactical, hopefully temporary expedient to mollify the barbarian
at the frontier whilst attending to more pressing problems of order within the heartland
of empire. The major problem facing China in this period was the disintegration of
centralised power and authority as evident in a host of social and economic prob-
lems, a series of revolts by secret societies and the expansion of criminal organisa-
tions that challenged the reach and prestige of the Qing regime.14 The Chinese found
a myriad of ways through which to thwart the market liberalisation that London and
the merchants sought to introduce, but perhaps most significant at a popular level
was simply the fact that ‘China would not abandon its own markets, methods and
products’ such that after 1843 the China trade actually contracted (leading Britain
to press China for the legalisation of opium).15 Ultimately, it was the deep cultural
and civilisational differences that explained the disappointment of British aspirations:
as Fairbank writes ‘the Chinese oecumene had not yet been shattered intellectually’.16
This said, in this increasingly fragmented political environment the effects of
the Treaty System and by inference the effects of gunboat diplomacy did play out
differently depending upon local conditions and carried different implications for
the possibilities of establishing a new institutional bases for the conduct of trade. In
this regard Canton and Shanghai marked the two ends of a spectrum. At Canton
officially sanctioned popular hostility towards the British made trade virtually impos-
sible such that the province was formally closed to the British after riots in 1846 on
the grounds that the safety of Europeans could no longer be guaranteed. Indeed, it
was the ongoing tensions over the rules of trade that led Palmerston to launch the
‘Second Opium’ or ‘Arrow War’ of 1856–60. By contrast, and to jump slightly ahead
of the period under consideration, the International Settlement in Shanghai in the
1850s became host to a large number of refugees fleeing the Taiping rebels and the
security of the settlement was itself threatened by the Cantonese-Fukienese rebels of
the Small Sword Society. In the absence of central Chinese power and authority, a
community of interests developed between the local Chinese and foreign communities
in the security of the Settlement and in the development of more effective administra-
tion. Thus it was, for example, that the Shanghai authorities cooperated with the
British in the liberalisation of commerce and the exploration of the Yangtze River
as the resultant increase in customs revenues would provide for the better administra-
tion and development of the province. In circumstances of local disorder and threat
the special status of Shanghai and the continued presence of British naval forces
offered a measure of protection that was appreciated by both parties.17
14 See, for example, Wiliam T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press, 2009); Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions. China From the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
15 Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p. 168, 167–8; see also Nathan A. Pelcovitis, Old China
Hands and the Foreign Office (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), pp. 15–17.
16 Fairbank, ‘The Creation of the Treaty System’, p. 226; see also Yen-P’ing Hao and Erh-Min Wang,
‘Changing Views of Western Relations, 1840–95’.
17 See Fairbank, ‘The Creation of the Treaty System’. By the 1860s, the Qing dynasty was itself beginning
to come to terms with the fact that the experience of relations with the European Powers did present a
significant challenge to the Chinese world view. See, for example, Yen-P’ing Hao and Erh-Min Wang,
‘Changing Views of Western Relations, 1840–95’.
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Notions of culture, civilisation, and identity – the oecumene – played out quite
differently in the Latin American context. In 1838 at the River Plate, or Banda
Oriental, a Uruguayan civil conflict developed a strong Argentine dimension. British
intervention in the civil war was as much an embarrassment as it was a failure
yet within a few years of British withdrawal the political aims for which Britain
had fought were now being freely given. Indeed, it is an irony of the case that the
apparent success of naval intervention in China in 1842 had encouraged the view of
merchants and the public that similar measures in Latin America would lead to the
opening of the vast interior to British manufactures and commerce, not least through
free navigation on the Parana´.18 By way of context, it had been less than thirty years
since Argentina had won its independence from Spain and many of the independence
generation were still in power. The process of nationbuilding and state formation
in this period was frequently violent, with wars against the Indians and between
rival caudillo leaders, sometimes with an ideological character. In 1828, Britain had
mediated the war between the Argentine and Brazil over Uruguay, leading to a
British commitment to the preservation of Uruguayan independence. For London,
Uruguay was a strategically valuable area positioned between the two large Powers
of the eastern seaboard on the River Plate and which in Montevideo offered an alter-
native commercial base and entrepoˆt to Buenos Aires.
Buenos Aires was the most powerful of the Argentine Confederation’s provinces
and its governor, General Rosas, had made his name in the Indian Wars of the
1830s. He had not, however, fought for independence in 1810, preferring the colonial
order, but four years earlier, aged 13, he had joined the fight to repulse the British
invasion of the River Plate. For Rosas, aside from the threat Montevideo presented
to Buenos Aires’ position as the regional commercial hub and generator of customs
revenues (in fact levels of trade in Buenos Aires far outstripped those at Montevideo),
the Uruguayan capital had become a base for his ‘unitarian’ political opponents.
Whereas the ‘federalists’ tended to support a decentralised political structure (which
suited the caudillos with their respective provincial power bases), and promoted the
notion of a sistema America hostile to European interference, the unitarians were
more cosmopolitan in outlook, advocated greater centralisation over control and dis-
tribution of resources and were more open to European migration and trade. This
said, whereas Rosas was ruthless against his domestic political opponents, British
subjects at Buneos Aires did not generally face interference in their affairs and whilst
British trade had failed to rise much in the first half of the nineteenth century19 the
rights of British subjects were for the most part respected and upheld.
When in October 1838, the deposed president of Uruguay, General Oribe fled
to Buenos Aires in the face of a revolt by his French backed predecessor, General
Rivera, he formed an alliance with Rosas whilst Rivera found backing from the
exiled Argentine Unitarian, General Lavalle. Palmerston offered good offices and
mediation and his successor, Aberdeen, sought to continue this policy with a view
to preventing the expansion of Rosas’ power and maintaining the independence of
Uruguay. However, by December 1842, ‘the Anglo-French mediation offer [had
taken] on the appearance of being more a mechanism for staving off a Uruguayan
18 McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853
(London: Tauris, 1995), p. 49.
19 John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas 1829–1852 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981),
p. 255.
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surrender than an impartial intervention’20 and by November 1843, Aberdeen and
Peel were exploring options for more robust involvement. Whilst notions of a joint
operation that would include Brazil were dropped, Aberdeen was in February 1845
bullish about the prospects for a joint Anglo-French naval demonstration: ‘it is
hardly possible’, he told his plenipotentiary, Wiliam Gore Ouseley, ‘to conceive that
when the consequences which must follow from a refusal to listen to the advice of the
two powers shall have been evident to [Rosas], he will allow it to pass unheeded’.21
Yet, by December he had lost confidence in the ability of Britain and France to force
a successful conclusion and became increasingly anxious about the proactive policies
of the representatives on the spot. Rosas and Oribe’s position was simply too strong
militarily; British commitment too weak. In November 1849, Britain accepted Rosas’
terms as ‘the only means of bringing the disastrous state of things now existing to
a favourable conclusion’.22 British intervention had failed in achieving its political
objectives of securing greater openness for commerce and access to the inland water-
ways. Arguably, its main contribution was to have prolonged the conflict for six
years when in 1843 Admiral Purvis prevented Rosas’ navy shelling Montevideo
such as to reduce Rivera’s defensive depth whilst Oribe’s land forces attempted to
deliver the decisive blow.23
Yet Rosas’ fortunes were soon to change for the worse as his increasing efforts to
concentrate power at Buenos Aires had fostered resentment and a countervailing
force such that between October 1851 and January 1852 Rosas’s erstwhile ally, the
governor of the strategically important state of Entre Rios, General de Urquiza in
alliance with Brazil and the Uruguayan government forced Oribe to surrender and
routed Rosas’ army. In what for Britain was a fortuitous twist of fate, whilst ‘the
dynamics of relations among the different provinces and states of the River Plate
were determined internally . . . the result, the stabilisation and unification of Argentina,
fulfilled Britain’s objectives’.24 Underlying local political dynamics was a change of
direction in Argentine political life from conflict to commerce, albeit one that bene-
fited from some real incentive in terms of the contemporary development of the
world economy. For McLean, ‘the introspective mentality of the Gaucho was dis-
appearing and the forces of the international economy would no longer be held
back by the political sterility of a generation steeped in the traditions of the indepen-
dence struggle’.25 Whilst the post-Rosas period did not mark a seamless break with
the past within the next two years the economic monopoly of Buenos Aires had been
replaced by freedom of navigation for international trade on the waterways of the
Plate and the development of constitutional reform and rise of immigration presaged
several decades of growth due to Argentina’s strong export trade.
20 McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, pp. 34–5.
21 Ibid., p. 64. McLean notes that in summer 1842, Rosas had warned Ouseley’s predecessor that whilst he
had no doubt an Anglo-French naval force could destroy his capital ‘his fanatical supporters would
withdraw into the countryside and conduct a guerrilla struggle against the invaders before they would
ever compromise’, p. 33.
22 McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, p. 164.
23 Lynch, Argentine Dictator, p. 274.
24 Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Longman,
1993), pp. 54–5.
25 McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, pp. 185–7; see also H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina
in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), p. 280.
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For Britain the strategic aim towards which intervention was employed was the
expansion of the zone of market access for its manufactured goods and the establish-
ment or stabilisation of the political conditions, which would sustain such access.
What, however, were the factors that actually determined this question and what
was the specific impact of military/naval intervention therein? In both the Chinese
and the Argentine cases the most powerful determinants of market access were
identity-based alignments, the wider appeal of the specific hegemonic project itself,
and in some cases (such as Shanghai) the appeal of reciprocal utility-based coopera-
tion. Moreover, these key determinants played out over a significantly longer time-
line than that associated with intervention, as one would expect given the nature of
the historical processes in play. For the South American states (and as shown in
more detail when discussing Brazil below) this was a very intense and violent period
of postcolonial state-consolidation following independence which played out over
the course of a generation. For China, the magnitude of the encounter with the
encroaching Western world was much greater and played out over a period of 150
years. However, in the shorter term defeat in the two Opium Wars did lead to the
rise of the ‘self-strengthening’ movement in the 1860s but this half-hearted and un-
successful nationalist-modernisation movement signalled a long-lasting ambivalence
in Chinese attitudes towards modernity and relations with the European world.26
Besides, arguably it was the Western missionaries who proved a more powerful
transformative force. The diffusion of Christian ideas provided a set of conceptual
ideas through which most famously the Taipings could articulate their grievances
and launch a civil war in which over twenty million people died, reinforcing the point
that the key drivers of change rested with the interplay of social forces and ideational
and cultural factors.27 In China the use of force contributed to a long-lasting current
of anti-Western political thought whilst at the River Plate it was an embarrassment
and in terms of British aims arguably even irrelevant.
Opening up II
In terms of the three important domains identified above, it is clear that in the
Chinese case the power of domestic political factors in the target state was sufficient
to severely limit the realisation of British ambitions as the civilisational and cultural
gulf could not be bridged through coercive means alone. The impenetrability of
social and cultural systems and active political resistance prevented the achievement
of an open, liberalised commercial space despite clear British naval superiority. In
terms of British domestic politics Palmerston was able to secure parliamentary support
in the First Opium War despite strong protests from speakers such as William
Gladstone. Out of interest, this was not the case in 1856 when an anti-war motion
was passed 263–49. In this case, Palmerston dissolved the government but secured
re-election with an increased majority and therein his war. However, as shown in
the remaining cases discussed below in other instances liberal institutions and political
processes did directly affect the conduct of major interventions in this period.
26 See, for example, Michael Oksenberg, ‘China’s Confident Nationalism’, Foreign Affairs, 65 (1986),
pp. 501–23.
27 Note, however, that British and French forces intervened to assist the Qing regime to defeat the
Taipings.
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At the River Plate the key determinant of the outcome of British intervention was
Rosas’ superior military position. However, whilst the problems of British policy
were at one level due to the forward actions of the British representatives ‘on the
spot’, underlying this was the lack of sound legal and political foundations that
undermined the entire intervention and which gave it a somewhat surreptitious
appearance. Public statements of non-belligerency severely limited the foreign secre-
tary’s options and embarrassed his position (as well as the country) after the onset
of what would now be called ‘mission-creep’. Whilst Aberdeen was disposed to a
cautious policy and did seek to limit the extent of Britain’s involvement, as the
official policy of neutrality was increasingly realised to be failing in the objective of
delivering a swift end to the war (and with it the release of Rosas’ grip on Montevideo)
then pressures for a more robust involvement grew. Not that the local naval com-
mander needed much encouragement. As part of his efforts to have the Argentine
government accept British and French mediation, Commodore Purvis lifted the
Argentine blockade of Montevideo only to be subsequently overruled by the advo-
cate general in London. The Law Lords clearly exposed the contradiction in Britain’s
position by pointing out that the right of the Argentine government as a belligerent
to impose the blockade ‘cannot be interfered with or controlled by any third state
professing neutrality between the contending parties’.28 Other clear instances of
partiality and interference included the launch by the British and French plenipoten-
tiaries of an expedition along the Parana´, which since 1841 Rosas had closed but to
those vessels holding authorisation from Buenos Aires; the commandeering of an
army battalion of 626 officers and men who had been en route to South Africa,
much to London’s dismay; and the operation of a selective blockade as a means
of revenue generation, incurring in turn a series of diplomatic protests from other
nations.
In November 1843, both Peel and Aberdeen maintained that British policy was
one of non-interference in accordance with principle, even if in private they were
becoming increasingly sensitive to commercial and popular pressures for action,
particularly as the inconsistency of their policy was in danger of ridicule.29 With the
continuing refusal by Rosas to accept British mediation, Aberdeen in December 1844
authorised Ouseley to undertake an armed intervention if diplomacy should once
again fail, the aims being to pacify the republics of the Plate, secure the definitive
independence of Uruguay, and the advancement of Britain’s commercial and diplo-
matic relations with all the states in the region, perhaps also establishing contacts
with Paraguay (which in effect meant an expedition on the Parana´). Yet in January
1846, Aberdeen was obliged to reveal his instructions to Ouseley in parliament which
in his words will ‘unfortunately render it manifest to everyone that our proceedings
in the River Plate are at variance with their letter and spirit’.30
It was shortly after this debacle that Aberdeen decided to seek a negotiated with-
drawal from the Plate, as for one thing it was difficult now to see where exactly a
policy of British intervention might go. Yet, as noted above, withdrawal was to take
another three years and was largely on Rosas’ terms. In the parliamentary debates
Aberdeen managed the remarkable achievement of incurring severe rebuke from
28 Quoted in Mclean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, p. 44.
29 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
30 Ibid., p. 88.
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Wellington, Palmerston, and Gladstone with the First Lord of the Admiralty sub-
sequently adding his own frustration.31 The surreptitious nature of the intervention
had granted licence to the ‘men on the spot’, frequently given the Uruguayans false
hope of greater assistance, prolonged but not determined the outcome, and em-
barrassed Britain both domestically and in the eyes of other Powers, whilst also
signalling British weakness to the ‘half-civilised governments’ of the world.32 The
failure of the British mission, then, was most obviously a function of the relative
balance of forces between the intervener and the target, but both the particularly
embarrassing nature of the intervention and its half-hearted nature were a function
of the stretching of its non-belligerency status without the approval of parliament
and failure either to maintain the spirit of that policy or to give a position of belli-
gerency proper authority.
Humanitarianism I
The British campaign to abolish the Atlantic slave trade to Brazil33 has in recent
years been held up as an example of what robust action can achieve, for a year after
Palmerston intensified naval action in 1849 the trade was virtually abolished.34 These
recent commentaries have tended to emphasise the military dimension of the cam-
paign and largely overlook developments within the target state, Brazil, or indeed
within the British political system.35 Two specialist studies have, however, argued
that by the time of the British naval intervention the Brazilian government had
already started to implement measures to abolish the trade.36 Be that as it may,
what in this case were the conditions and factors that determined the suppression
of the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil and what was the specific impact of British
intervention? Vital in fact was the will and capacity of local elites to effect suppres-
sion and, importantly, this was itself dependent upon the development of historically
specific processes of nation-state consolidation and state capacity-building following
Brazil’s independence from Portugal. Hence with Miller, ‘the eventual abolition of
the slave trade depended on a favourable conjuncture of political and economic
forces within the country as well as Palmerston’s threats, although these were crucial
to the timing of the abolition’.37
31 See ibid., pp. 90–1 for details of the criticism and highlighting of the discrepancy between official and
actual policy.
32 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 51; see also McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire,
p. 188.
33 This section draws upon John MacMillan, ‘Myths and Lessons of Liberal Intervention: the British
Campaign for the Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade to Brazil’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 4
(2012), pp. 92–117.
34 See, for example, Lord Clive Soley, ‘The Right Side of History’, {http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=
en&biw=1260&bih=863&q=soley+right+side+of+history&oq=soley+right+side+of+history&aq=f&
aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=8186l9983l0l14l8l0l0l0l0l0l0ll0} accessed 26 June 2011, pp. 2–3. See also
Gary J. Bass, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century’, The Tocqueville Review, 30:1 (2009),
pp. 17–35; Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons
for Global Power (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 139, 303–17.
35 On this last point one can also include Douglas Hurd, Choose Your Weapons: the British Foreign
Secretary, 200 years of Argument, Success and Failure (London: Phoenix, 2011), pp. 83–4.
36 Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), p. 311; Jeffrey D. Needell , ‘The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade in 1850: Historiography,
Slave Agency and Statesmanship’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 33 (2001), pp. 681–711.
37 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 55.
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Palmerston had intensified the campaign on the West African and the Brazilian
coasts a decade earlier but whilst this did squeeze the trade it antagonised the Brazil-
ians and, as will be discussed below, was abandoned for legal reasons. But, in any
case, the 1830s for Brazil was a period of such severe political violence, disorder,
and limited state capacity that the suppression of the trade at this point was not
a feasible prospect. After the emperor, Dom Pedro I – of whom more below – had
abdicated and returned to Europe in 1831 a subsequent liberal reformist moderado
government decentralised power in a move intended to mark a departure from the
centralised and authoritarian practices of the monarchy but which had the effect of
fuelling violent competition for power in the provinces. Indeed, the ‘perception and
reality of state power were probably weaker in 1835 than they had ever been in the
nation’s history’.38 Upon returning to office in 1837, the Conservatives undertook
a process of recentralisation and increased state control over the local judiciary and
restored the Council of State. The end of the regency marked by the crowning in
1841 of the new emperor, Dom Pedro II, further stabilised the country. Financially,
Brazil’s refusal to renew the unpopular and non-reciprocal commercial treaty with
Britain and to impose its own tariff regime generated approximately half of the
government’s revenue, which in turn enabled the development of the navy which
was available for anti-slave trade patrols. Whilst violence was still widespread during
the 1840s, the provincial revolts were defeated through the combined use of the
police and the national guards and thus when the Conservatives returned to power
in 1848 after the ineffective quinqeno liberal they formed the ‘strongest and most
stable [government] Brazil had known since independence’.39
By 1850, then, Brazil had a level of political and state capacity that it did not
have a decade earlier. Thus when British intervention forced the crisis of 1849–50
and the prospect of further disorder and war the Conservative elite not only wished
to safeguard the Brazilian nation-state, which they had struggled to consolidate and
develop over the course of their political careers, but they were also in a position to
do so, albeit at the cost of losing long-term access to fresh supplies of slave labour.40
It was, then, Brazilian nationbuilding and state-formation – processes that are mea-
surable in terms of decades – that provided the necessary institutional capacity for
the achievement of British foreign policy aims.
Humanitarianism II
The discussion above traced the importance of domestic political developments in
Brazil and the underlying process of nationbuilding and state consolidation for the
abolition of the slave trade, and that in this regard Palmerston’s naval action of
1849 was well-timed. But this fortuitous synchronisation between Palmerston’s inten-
sified naval unilateralism and domestic political developments within Brazil was also
38 Jeffrey D. Needell, The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian
Monarchy, 1831–1871 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 60–1; see also Bethell, Abolition,
p. 79. For the violent character of this period see Needell, The Party of Order, pp. 61, 95–105; also
E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (2nd edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980),
pp. 170–86.
39 Bethell, Abolition, pp. 341–2.
40 This interpretation is drawn from Needell, Abolition, p. 707.
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subject to a range of pressures from within British domestic politics where support
for this long and costly campaign which had hitherto been, at best, a limited success,
was in decline. In 1846, support for the reduction of duties on slave grown sugar
had shown the limits of humanitarian sentiments amongst the British public and in
parliament too rising support for the abandonment of the campaign was reflected in
the fortunes of the Select Committees on the topic led by the free trader William
Hutt.
But Palmerston’s intensification of naval enforcement action in 1849 was the
second time he had taken a unilateralist turn away from the flawed treaty-based pre-
ventive stop-and-search system. Previously, however, the Law Lords had withdrawn
their support for the policy when first applied in 1839 and the slave traders them-
selves had brought legal action against individual ship captains for the illegal con-
fiscation of property. Consequently, tactics changed and authorisation for such
forward action was revoked. Whilst captures had increased, the disjuncture between
the domestic political and naval/military domains had proved a major setback. This
time, in an effort to avoid a similar fate, Palmerston had authorised his unilateralist
turn on the basis of the Aberdeen Act (1845) that equated the slave trade with piracy.
Yet it was fortunate that the Brazilian response was so swift, for there were soon
signs that the Law Lords were losing confidence in the legality of the actions this
time around too which in light of the rising political disaffection with the campaign
may have proved terminal.41 In this case, then, the favourable synchronisation of
developments within the intervener’s military and political domains and that of Brazil’s
domestic domain did produce the intervener’s desired outcome. This was rather
fortunate, for as in earlier periods it appeared that the dealignment of the domestic
political from the military timelines was again pushing shut the window of syn-
chronisation.
Revolutions I
Between 1815 and 1850, three main waves of revolution broke across the European
continent, from 1820–4, 1829–34, and 1847–51.42 Each wave triggered interventionist
pressures from states associated with either the absolutist or constitutionalist cause,
notably Austria, Russia, and Prussia on the one hand and Britain and France on
the other, albeit dependent upon regime type and political party. Yet the underlying
difference between the absolutist and the constitutional positions was articulated in
Castlereagh’s response to a Russian proposal at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle in
1818 that the Powers should not only guarantee the territorial settlement of Vienna
but also the governments of other states. This, Castlereagh argued, would mean that
‘force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power without
any consideration of the extent to which it was abused’.43
As noted above whilst intervention in this period might settle or influence the
immediate outcome of specific revolutions, it did not settle the ‘problem’ of revolution
per se. What did settle this question in Europe, at least until the First World War, was
41 See Bethell, Abolition; MacMillan, ‘Myths and Lessons’, p. 109.
42 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789–1848 (London: Abacus, 2009 [orig. pub. 1962]), pp. 138–9.
43 Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–1822 (Bell: London, 1947), p. 51 (quoted
in Vincent, Nonintervention, p. 75).
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a fundamental shift in class-based political alignments such that after 1830 the ‘united
front’ against absolutism became increasingly fragmented. After 1848, many ‘moderate
republicans’ allied with the high bourgeoisie and the aristocracy against the radical
republican challenge to property. In this way, the revolutions of 1848 ‘gave birth to
a new form of conservatism, able to absorb elements of liberalism, nationalism, and
even socialism, and to transform them almost beyond recognition’.44 It was, then,
shifts in patterns of class relations that provided the institutional bases for the
longer-term settlement of the recurring issue of revolution in European politics in
this period, and the cries for intervention that it generated. Also worthy of note in
this regard is Schroeder’s argument that the Concert system also deserves recognition
for managing questions of revolution in so far as it provided a Europe-wide institu-
tional framework through which Powers of different ideological complexions could
soothe and negotiate their differences.45
Revolution II
The discussion of revolution and intervention above highlighted the significance of
longer-term class realignments as the political-institutional framework that settled
the issue of revolution in Europe in this period, and that these social forces took
several decades to work themselves through. Yet a closer look at British intervention
practice in this period reveals its ideological and partisan character such that in the
Iberian Peninsula in the late 1820s–1830s the arbiter of British policy was effectively
the electoral cycle and whether it brought Wellington or Palmerston into office.
In 1826, Dom Pedro I, emperor of Brazil, succeeded to the Portuguese throne
but abdicated in favour of his infant daughter, Don˜a Maria, to whom he granted a
Charter of limited (constitutional) monarchy. However, the following year Pedro’s
brother, Dom Miguel, declared himself king and abolished the Charter. Miguel was
backed by the church, the army, and the majority of the aristocracy and soon estab-
lished control over the state. Wellington was on the verge of recognising the regime
when the Tories were succeeded by the Whig Reform Ministry in November 1830
whereupon his successor, Palmerston, refused to recognise Miguel and sought to
re-energise the constitutionalist cause. For Wellington, the stability offered through
Miguel’s model of rule was far preferable to a period of regency or constitutional
experimentation and well-served British interests of security for commerce and the
counter-balancing of French and Spanish influence, which following the July Revo-
lution in France he regarded as especially urgent.
The Portuguese question was for both sides in this period ‘a vital issue in the
great conflict of the age between what the Tories called ‘revolution’ and ‘order’ and
the Whigs ‘reform’ and ‘reaction’.46 In this contest, the ‘civil war of 1832 to 1834
marked a brutal mid-point in the slowly developing revolution which carried Portugal
from royal absolutism to constitutional democracy’.47 Dom Pedro I had continued
44 Michael Broers, Europe After Napoleon, 1799–1815 (London: Arnold, 1996), p. 118 (quoted in Owen,
The Clash of Ideas, p. 155).
45 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
46 Roger Bullen, ‘Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Whigs, Tories and Iberian Affairs, 1830-6’, Bulletin of
the Institute of Historical Research, 51:123 (London: University of London, 1978), p. 40.
47 David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
p. 113.
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to support Maria and Palmerston sought Pedro’s return from Brazil in order to
restore the constitutionalist cause. After this initiative failed due to the lack of
support from the Eastern Powers Palmerston became increasingly convinced of an
anti-constitutionalist conspiracy between the Tories, the Eastern Powers, and the
Miguelites. His response was to argue for a policy of Anglo-French intervention but
faced with a lack of cabinet support turned instead to a policy of covert support for
Maria whilst publicly defending the policy of non-intervention, not least to prevent
the Spanish from supporting Miguel and preventing Pedro and Maria landing at
Oporto.
Attitudes of the Whigs and the Tories towards the principle of non-intervention at
this point were principally instrumental. The Tories were furious with the substance
of Whig policy but were constrained from attacking it in parliament on substantive
grounds due to fear of being labelled apologists for absolutism, so challenged instead
the government’s failure to maintain the stated policy of non-intervention. If the
government had pursued a policy of non-intervention the likely outcome would
have been that Miguel would have defeated Maria’s advance and absolutism would
have prevailed. The Eastern Powers, for their part, ‘were convinced that the whigs
would shortly be defeated on the Reform Bill and would be succeeded by a tory
government which would recognise Miguel’.48
Yet it was a development at the regional level – the death in September 1833 of
Ferdinand VII in Spain – that unblocked the military impasse through leading the
queen regent, Queen Christina, to cooperate with Britain in the removal of Miguel
due to his support of the principal challenger to her daughter’s throne, Don Carlos,
who was arming in Portugal for an invasion of Spain. From this emerged in April
1834 the Whig creation of the Quadruple Alliance, which Palmerston regarded as
the political expression of a new constitutionalist movement on Europe’s Western
seaboard and which, through the exercise of Spanish land and British naval forces
replaced Miguel with Maria.
In the Portuguese case, then, a political shift at the regional level enabled the
formation of a coalition that settled a civil war that the Whigs had in fact revived
for political and ideological reasons. Whilst liberal institutions had operated to deny
authority for the continued expansion of the conflict this did not prevent Palmerston
from expanding operations covertly. However, the partisan character of British
policy soon re-emerged as the focus of Iberian affairs shifted to Spain and initially
at least Britain and France sought to assist the Spanish government in suppressing
the Carlist revolt that had sprung up in northern Spain. After Don Carlos had
surrendered to British naval forces in 1834, he refused to renounce his claims to the
Spanish throne and in June returned to Spain, which, the Spanish government argued,
left the terms of the April 1834 treaty unfulfilled. Palmerston was sympathetic to this
view and worked for a number of Additional Articles to the Alliance which obliged
the French to prevent support reaching the Carlists through France whilst the British
would supply the Spanish government with arms and if necessary a naval force. For
Palmerston, these were quite possibly the first steps to a more extensive intervention,
should the situation require it, and Palmerston himself was disappointed when the
Law Lords prevented him from instituting a blockade in the absence of belligerent
status.
48 Bullen, ‘Party Politics’, p. 39.
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However, the Tories strongly resented the Additional Articles and Wellington, who
returned to office as foreign secretary in December 1834, regarded them as marking the
limits of British involvement. At this point ‘the civil war in Spain was the most press-
ing external problem which confronted the new government’.49 Wellington pursued a
stronger non-interventionist line but did look to the possibility of an alliance with the
Eastern Powers in order to dissuade a French advance over the Pyrenees. Whilst he
was becoming more confident of the prospect of an eventual Carlist victory, his main
efforts at this point were directed towards limiting the scale of atrocities, which he
felt would jeopardise the prospects for peace between the two parties. However, in
April 1835, the Whigs returned to office and under Palmerston the emphasis of policy
shifted once again from the containment of France to the containment of absolutism.
But Palmerston found himself becoming increasingly drawn into the conflict such
that the supply of arms had expanded to include the recruitment of British volun-
teers, the despatch of the French Foreign Legion, British naval action, and accep-
tance in principle of the hitherto unwelcome option of sending the French army into
Spain. However, Louis Philippe refused such a step, leading to the fall of the Thiers
government in September 1836 and the collapse of the Quadruple Alliance and
replacement by a strongly non-interventionist successor. In the Spanish case, then,
the expansion of a partisan intervention, which then as now is precarious grounding
for a national policy, was halted only by developments in a third state. But besides,
historians are doubtful about the longer-term impact of British intervention in the
conflict. Whilst Palmerston’s intervention in the region was clearly influential as the
preservation of a constitutional regime in Portugal denied the Carlists a second front,
it was ‘in no sense the crucial factor in the final defeat of Carlism’50 and after the war
ended in 1839 the underlying issues remained unresolved.51
Conclusion
The empirical focus of this analysis has been upon the key themes in British interven-
tion for purposes of liberal reordering in the period between 1815–50, namely the
‘opening-up’ and stabilisation of market spaces, the termination of the Atlantic slave
trade to Brazil, and the coercive mediation of contests between absolutist and con-
stitutionalist social forces. Whilst these themes are specific to a particular period in
the development of the modern world, they may also be situated within a longer
range historical narrative of modernity in terms of the expansion of a capitalist world
economy, modern conceptions of the ‘subject’, the ‘state-based’ political administra-
tion of territory, inter-civilisational dynamics and hierarchies, and the play of political
and ideological ideas centred around the notion of ‘democracy’.
Considering intervention in relation to the specific themes, questions or (for the
intervening Powers) ‘problems’ of the age enables due emphasis to be placed upon
the ordering and reordering nature of such tasks, their scale, and importantly also
the timeframes that are likely to be in play. Such considerations are vital if one is to
develop an appropriately strategic understanding of the place of intervention in such
49 Bullen, ‘Party Politics’, p. 49.
50 Ibid., p. 57; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 147.
51 William D. Phillips and Carla Rahn Phillips, A Concise History of Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p. 215.
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(re)ordering projects. In the period under discussion the most significant deter-
minants of British (re-) ordering were rarely the interventions per se. Rather, it was
the effect of a number of wider factors and processes such as nationbuilding and the
consolidation of state-capacity; the degrees of cultural and ideational affinity between
intervener and target and calculations of rational-instrumental utility over the short
and longer-term; and the shifting balance of class forces in the social structure of
nations. Whilst military intervention was not necessarily inconsequential and at times
may have made a vital difference to the outcome of specific questions, it was not able
to run against these deeper historical currents despite the often exaggerated view of
its impact held by policymakers and analysts.
That intervention is neither autonomous from wider political and historical forces
nor able to provide a ‘quick fix’ to political ‘problems’ reinforces the point that it
is necessary to maintain a firm grip on the prospective utility and limits of military
intervention in relation to the wider sociological determinants of major strategic
issues. In the nineteenth century, the issues that states sought to intervene over were
themselves subject to deeper sets of historical, sociological, and institutional deter-
minants that were often not visible to the intervening actors themselves and which
played out over a matter of decades. As the contest then between constitutionalism
and absolutism, the abolition of the slave trade, or the opening and stabilisation of
market spaces was primarily determined by deeper sociological and political forces,
then so too now the fate of relations between Islamic and Western political forces,
the stable administration (in whatever form) of those territorial spaces that are
presently the subject of ‘state-building’ interventions, or the spread of democracy.52
This raises important questions about the strategic balance between the political
and military aspects of Western foreign policy. In particular, and aside from the
question of whether intervention is in fact necessary, the historical analysis above
points to the need for military intervention’s role or contribution to be clearly articu-
lated in terms of a wider grand strategy grounded in a fully political understanding
of the themes and issues in question. Without this, military intervention is but the
militarisation of foreign policy.
The theoretical contribution to the evaluation of specific intervention outcomes
has been to emphasise the importance of systematically analysing developments in
three domains: the domestic political conditions in the intervening state, the domestic
political conditions in the target state, and of course the military dimension itself.
Factors in any of these domains can be sufficient to adversely affect (from the inter-
vener’s perspective) the outcome of an intervention and besides this the empirical
analysis above supports the notion that there needs to be sufficient alignment or syn-
chronisation between the various timelines that determine developments within each
domain. Hence Palmerston’s second period of robust unilateralism in the slave trade
campaign coincided with favourable political and institutional developments in
Brazil in a way that was not possible a decade earlier; whilst Argentinean elites
came to identify greater participation in the growing world economy with their own
wish to move beyond the period of post-independence struggles and with their own
sociocultural aspirations, Qing elites perceived matters differently; and whilst leading
52 See, on these questions, Adam Roberts, ‘The ‘‘war on terror’’ in historical perspective’, Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy, 47:2 (2005), pp. 101–30; Shahar Hameiri, Regulating Statehood: State Building
and the Transformation of The Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); Alexander B. Downes and
Jonathan Monten, ‘Forced to be Free?’, International Security, 37:4 (2013), pp. 90–131.
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British actors were committed to a particular side in the civil contests on the Iberian
Peninsula, this was in fact to different sides, reflecting political and ideological divi-
sions within British and European society and preventing the maintenance of a
consistent foreign policy. Whilst any general conclusions from the study of one
period must necessarily be tentative, there is a prima facie case that the requirement
for matters to go sufficiently well across the three domains and for sufficient syn-
chronisation between them is an important reason why liberal interventions so often
prove more difficult, complex, and protracted than the protagonists expect.
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